Such a progression occurred against the tide of state demands. All ruling juntas wanted to control the majority of seats in the parliament. In the end, the democratic settlement took shape in terms of a compromise between the old state and the opposition, and in most case this produced a smooth transition without blood shed.

Burma, as I mentioned above, has a unique character. Steps one to four were the same as in the Eastern Europe model, yet by steps five and six, a unique Burmese pattern takes shape. Burma held its election without first drafting an appropriate constitution-moved which reverse the European sequence. In those elections, the elections returns did not favor SLORC. Still, SLORC gave the excuse that they could not hand over power without a strong constitution, and refused to hand power over to the winning party. They have been drawing up the new constitution since 1993. SLORC has also been trying to promote the country's deeply corrupt and long mismanaged economic system. Still, the regime's suppression of emerging political elements and the soaring basic consumer prices will make SLORC the victim of a future economic failure.

Unlike Burma, Poland transferred power to the winning opposition party, Solidarity. Lech Welesa became the first democratically elected President. But the Polish people thought that if they elected the Solidarity party their living conditions would be improved within short period. These expectations proved unreasonable. No government can improve the country's long ailing economy in one term. After four years of essentially unchanged living conditions, Poles voted the former communist party leader into office at the next election. Hence, economic failure is the main factor which brought down the existing regime. Poles said "Walesa brought democracy to us we appreciated him but his time is over now." The Polish Communist Party tolerated the opposition's existence and compromised with them to work towards a peaceful way to establish democracy. Later they got a chance to rule the country by free elections in the second term. They increasingly moved away from their formerly violent ruling tactics.

National Convention

In Burma, the military leaders called a National Convention with 810 delegates to draw up a new constitution. Among the delegates, only 100 were elected representatives eligible to participate. The NC committee set strict rules and blunt guidelines. In this framework it was stipulated that the army would take a leading role in politics. This provision created the tension between NLD and SLORC. As a result, NLD walked out from the conference. Without the majority of the elected NLD representatives, the NC became meaningless. SLORC tried to punish NLD by capturing second line leaders and their supporters. In addition, they stopped the weekend speeches made by Aung San Suu Kyi and two Vice Presidents.

Aung San Suu Kyi wrote a series about Burma in Mianichi Shinbun daily. Her recent article explained the meaning of the word "Veteran." She called attention to prominent former soldiers, including Bo Hmu Aung who was one of the members "Thirty comrades, " a group that included Aung San and Ne Win. She praised Bo Hmu Aung as a faithful soldier as well as a good son of Burma who endlessly sought his country's development. This year, Bo Hmu Aung and former veterans wrote a letter to SLORC and urged them to talk with the NLD party; SLORC, however, responded by warning the veterans to stay away from politics. Her Article's "Veteran" indirectly attacked Ne Win for his ignorance because he started the military rule in Burma and is the only one who has the strongest influence in the army.

Burma and Indonesia

This month, Ne Win emerged once more onto the world stage. He visited Indonesia and met with President Suharto. The move took on particular significance because many believe that Ne Win urged SLORC leaders to adopt Indonesia's model. In fact, Indonesia and Burma have two striking similarities: both are controlled by the army, and in both their armies emerged under the Japanese occupation. In other respects, the two countries are more completely different.

Take, for example, the role of US support in regime formation. The US government spent billions of dollars and used its soldiers to protect states in the region against communist influence in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Indonesia wiped out the communist influence with its own army and without US intervention. That's why they got a lot of financial and technical support from the West, US and Japan. In Burma, on the other hand, the generals wiped out democratically elected government by force and adopted Socialism for its future course. They criticized western countries as capitalist and neo colonialist, and rejected Western aid. Instead, they worked more closely with the Soviet Union and Eastern Block countries. Under Ne Win's rule, the regime turned down many Western scholarship, and only a few Burmese scholars were sent to Eastern Europe and Russia.

Worse, under Ne Win, the government nationalized big and small scale industries, moves which shrank the country's production rate and size. Burmese born native minorities such as Indian-Burmese and Chinese -Burmese were discriminated against and virtually wiped out in the country. The military, ranging from corporal to Brigadier General, soon occupied all the top business sectors and administrative offices in nationalized concerns. Technocrats and professionals were put aside and humiliated.

In June 1975, before the outbreak of the June Student Demonstration, BSPP Central Executive committee member Dr. Hla Han explained to the Veterinary students that in the past the country's population was only 14 million but by 1975, this had risen to over 30 million. The consumer rate more than double but the volume of rice production remained about the same. In consequence, Burmese faced rice shortages. Yet in this explanation, Dr. Hla Han failed to address an obvious counter-example : Thailand's population also soared more than that in Burma, yet that country became one of the leading rice producers and exported much of this produce to the world.

On the other hand, before Suharto reigns, Indonesia will have begun to import rice from foreign countries, although when the current president took power Indonesia imported no rice whatsoever. Suharto's regime embraced many Indonesian technocrats, economists, native Chinese business men to help rebuild the country and successfully overcome the double-digit inflation in the late 1960s. Now Indonesia is one of the leading countries in ASEAN.

Another crucial fact that has helped Indonesia's prosperity has been the discovery of oil fields in its off shore coast; the find gave the country a tremendous opportunity to boost its economy. In Burma, oil wells are drying out and now Burma has been importing oil from Japan and other countries.

The final and crucial difference between these countries is their respective leadership patterns. Indonesia is ruled by one person, Suharto. Nobody can compare or challenge his authority. He became an institution in Indonesia with the support of both military and technocrats. In contrast, SLORC is runs by a group of military generals who hold relatively equal rank and status with one another. SLORC lacks a strong leader like Ne Win. The relative parity among SLORC's members creates trouble: as the Burmese saying runs; "Two lions cannot live together in a cave".

In short, Indonesia's political stability has until now had a great deal to do with the presence of a strong man, and the authority he exercises. But its stabilization also depends on that one person, and the question of succession once again raises the specter of turmoil and uncertainty. For both reasons, the Indonesian model is not a fit guide for Burma's democratization process and future development.

Future Course

NLD and SLORC have confronted each other since 1988. Their confrontation became heated when NLD boycotted from National Convention and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi called for economic sanction. In return, SLORC froze the NLD movements and detained many of its members. The death grip which the two parties held on one another, however, seemed to ease this month. Both sides recently claimed the same objectives: a willingness to build a truly democratic country and the preservation of the nation. The parties' main disagreement regards which of the two will be allowed to lead the country on its future course. The NLD already have a mandate to rule, won in the past elections. SLORC, for its part, maintains the coercive apparatus to compel Burmese to accept its rule. If both parties can forget past confrontations and personal hatred, they might begin to start round table negotiations marked by mutual respect. Such a development would do much to brighten up Burma's future.

The only way out of this dead lock is a national convention. NLD needs to return to the convention and SLORC needs to withdraw guide lines and strict regulations it as laid down to hamper such assemblies. The convention needs a free discussion. Minority rights need to discussed and protected --and for this the NLD seems most suitable. To reach an agreement or a settlement through force is not good for Burma's long-term interests. Some radical minority groups wanted a full independence from Burma; such cases will be solved by NLD with the help of the army. Within the process of drawing up a new constitution, both parties understand each other and might gain "trust" on the common ground of their shared interest in preventing the nation from disintegrating.

The National Democratic Front (NDF) declared in 1982 that they wanted to stay in the Union and so it disregarded the succession right. KNU leader General Bo Mya and KIO leader Brang Seng expressed in the DAB meeting their intentions to stay in the union, but they wanted a guarantee of protected and genuine minority rights. NLD is capable of solving these problems, because many NLD representatives and members fled to minority-controlled areas, and lived there after 1988. They understand minority demands, and they are building trust between the two sides. Other active student organizations, like the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) have strong connections with minorities. The ABSDF is well trusted by the Burmese people and the armed minority groups because they are the sons and daughters of the people of different back ground, fighting the military rule with the minorities. Given these characteristics, both NLD exiles and ABSDF can serve as a bridge between minorities and NLD.

The Role of U Ne Win

U Ne Win introduced military rule in Burma and was known as second father of the modern Burmese army. He is the only man on earth who still has influence over the Burmese army. If he wants to solve the present situation by using his influence within the SLORC to convince the regime to agree to round table negotiation with NLD without restriction, the problems will likely be solved smoothly. But U Ne Win is not likely to do this, although if he does, he will be the one most admired by the Burmese people.