INDONESIA AND BURMA HAVE FOLLOWED REMARKABLY SIMILAR COURSES OVER THE LAST THREE DECADES. HTUN AUNG GYAW TAKES A LOOK AT THE PARALLELS.

The recent demonstrations in Indonesia resemble those that took place in Burma in 1988. Twenty-six years of economic mismanagement and hardship as well as political oppression drove the Burmese people to nationwide demonstrations that year. During those protests, the army killed more than 3,000 people, many in circumstances eerily similar to those occurring in Indonesia now.

Thirty-six years ago, General Ne Win staged a coup that overthrew the civilian government of Burma. He declared that the country was on the brink of chaos and that it was the army's duty to prevent it from falling into disorder. Ne Win adopted socialist economic policies, centralising the nation's economy, and led Burma into a downward spiral from being one of the most prosperous nations in Southeast Asia during the 1960s to one of the poorest in the world by the 1980s.

Because of these economic hardships and widespread political repression, the Burmese people, led by university students, have protested against the government in the years since Ne Win's rise to power. In 1988, working people joined the students in demonstrations that spread all across the country. Ne Win resigned his office, but the Burmese army put down the unarmed demonstrators without mercy, taking the lives of more than 3,000 citizens. The military staged another coup, and formed a new ruling junta under the supervision of Ne Win himself.

Thirty-two years ago, the Indonesian communist party, the strongest opposition party in that country, was crushed by anti-communist riots that resulted in the deaths of thousands of communist party members and ethnic Chinese. Sukarno, who had been named "president for life", was forced to hand over political power to Gen Suharto in 1966. The rise of Suharto was welcomed by the West and by the United States because he had been able to quash the communist threat without outside assistance.

Suharto proceeded to create the Golkar party, which was authorised to select the candidate for president. Without fail for seven elections, the Golkar party chose Suharto as its nominee and enabled him to rule the country for 32 years until his resignation last month. Under his rule, Indonesia benefitted from two favourable economic developments. One was the discovery of off-shore oil fields, and the other was the hike in oil prices in the 1970s. The Suharto regime has always showered its ruling elite and his own family with special business privileges.

Corruption and nepotism have flourished in this system of crony capitalism, as Suharto's own family is said to have accumulated almost US$40 billion by means of subsidies and monopolies. As a result, the gap between rich and poor widened terribly. The Indonesian people have become dissatisfied with the regime for its corruption and misuse of power. But the support from the Western powers and the surging economic growth in Asia enabled Suharto to stay in power until the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia.

Major events that have occurred in both Burma and Indonesia during the past three decades have seemed to mirror each other. Thirty-two years ago, Suharto staged a coup de force; Ne Win took power four years earlier on March 2, 1962. Suharto took power from Sukarno on March 11,1966. Ne Win ousted his rivals in the army before the coup of 1962. Similarly, the deaths of seven Indonesian generals on Sept 30,1965 - blamed on communists - still remain shrouded in mystery. To this day no one has established who carried out those assassinations. Suharto was the sole general to survive this incident and rose to became dictator without competition.

Both dictators used the military to suppress pro-democracy protests and to exploit each country's natural resources. In both cases they have monopolised the economic, social and political institutions of their respective countries. This has resulted in widespread corruption, financial mismanagement and human rights abuses. Each dictator has brought great riches to their close family and friends. The upper classes in Indonesia and Burma did not emerge from fair and legitimate economic competition.

It is also important to note that the military institutions of both nations emerged as a result of strikingly similar historical circumstances. Both armies were formed under Japanese occupation and were built up into tightly consolidated units after the coups of the 1960s. Unlike in the liberal governments of the world, in Burma and in Indonesia the military remains a constant presence in everyday civilian life.

There are, however, some obvious differences between the two armies. The Indonesia army is well-fed; Burma's is not. This can be attributed partly to the fact that Suharto's policies brought about economic growth that raise living standards nationwide, so his soldier naturally benefitted. In Burma, it has only been the top military officers who have reaped such gains from the system, not by means of economic reform but through purely corrupt measures. Low ranking Burmese soldiers, on the other hand, resort to extortion and thievery to supplement their meager incomes.

They exploit in particular people in rural areas by simply taking their possessions or forcing them into slavery. This barbarism is a side-effect of Ne Win's failed economic policies. From the start he followed a closed-door, protectionist line, which has caused uncontrollable inflation and precipitated the rapid decline of Burma's economy into one of the poorest in the world. Thus, the economic plight of the country, which turned soldiers into thieves robbing an already poverty-stricken populace, was the major reason behind the widespread demonstrations that broke out all over Burma in 1988. The students had had enough of the disintegration of the economy as well as the repression of political freedom and elimination of basic human rights. The first series of demonstrations took place in March of 1988 and grew into an uprising that peaked on Aug 8, 1988.

The second wave of discontent occurred shortly after the March demonstrations when the general population witnessed the brutality of the regime. Students were massacred in one peaceful demonstration after another, and these cold-blooded acts, in conjunction with 26 years of swelling anger among the populace, reached a breaking point on 8-8-88.

During the recent uprising, Suharto's military followed a pattern similar to that of Ne Win in 1988. In order to suppress the demonstrators, without making the regime appear to be any more brutal than it was already perceived to be, they used a series of covert tactics to provide justification for their savage measures.

The Burmese military often hired thugs to go out and loot or burn property in the vicinity of a demonstration, thus giving the soldiers an excuse to open fire on the crowds near the looting and brand all whom they shot as looters. There have been reports that only a handful of Indonesian students have been killed, but the reported deaths of hundreds of looters bring to mind a statement concerning the 1988 demonstrations made by Burma's Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw.

In those protests, 545 people were killed, according to the junta. Ohn Gyaw reported that 525 of them had been looters and that only 20 had been protesters. To the witnesses of the massacre; this was far from the truth, both in the low numbers and in the true actions of the victims. Another tactic was to hire a few people to mingle among the protesters and commit acts of violence during a peaceful demonstration, giving the troops a reason to open fire. It is quite likely that the Indonesian junta also adopted this method.

Another common tactic employed by the two juntas to maintain their power without having to themselves commit violence has been to blame minority groups for the ills of their respective countries. Ethnic native Chinese have often been used as scapegoats in order to deflect the anger toward both governments.

In the past week, ethnic Chinese have found themselves in extreme peril, having to literally flee for their lives, because Suharto's son-inlaw attacked Chinese businessmen for their lack of sympathy for the country's worsening economic problems. In Burma and Indonesia, ethnic Chinese own much of the wealth; in Indonesia's case, they own a staggering 75 per cent of it while making up only 5 per cent of the population. It is clearly not difficult to exacerbate an already existing resentment on the part of the majority. During the 1967 rice shortages in Burma, the junta spread rumours that Chinese students were intent on taking over the country and that the shortages had been caused by Chinese merchants.

The results were shockingly brutal pogroms, in which people on the verge of starvation lynched many innocent Chinese students, with the Burmese regime escaping the desperate fury of the people.

On March 13, 1988, six students were shot dead at the Rangoon Institute of Technology while demonstrating inside their campus; an incident that sparked a series of demonstrations. Similarly, six students were shot dead at Trisakti University, which provoked the nationwide demonstrations in Indonesia.

In Burma, the March demonstration spread nationwide on Aug 8, 1988, known as "four eights" (8.8.88), and paralysed the government. In the heat of these massive demonstrations, various opposition forces came to the fore but, sadly, they failed to unite with each other. Former prime minister U Nu, once Ne Win's close aide, Brigadier Gen Aung Gyi, former Gen Tin Oo, Bo Yan Naing and Aung San Suu Kyi never reached an agreement over the formation of a coalition government.

The power vacuum was shortly filled by the military. The Burmese military established the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or Slorc, which has since become the SPDC in order to give the impression that a change of government has taken place. Ne Win declared he would step down, and did so officially; however he went on to play the role of a puppet master, controlling the military junta from behind the scenes. Ne Win's strategy was to fade quietly into the background while maintaining his grip on the military.

The events of the past few weeks, however, suggest that it will not be as easy for Suharto to pull a copycat act and turn himself into a puppet-master. The government of the new president, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, has allowed the passage of laws liberalising Indonesia's elections.

Up to now only three political parties have been allowed to run in the elections, and any campaigning could only be carried out in the few weeks before the actual vote. Furthermore, in what are signs of an internal power struggle within the ruling party, the chief of the armed forces, Gen Wiranto has spoken out against Suharto's son-in-law, Lt Gen Prabowo Subianto, indicating that certain elements of the military are ready to turn on the Suharto clan. Pragbowo has been transferred to head up a military academy.

Other positive developments in Indonesia include resignations by relatives of Habibie and Wiranto in an attempt to make good on promises to put an end nepotism in public life. The new government has also released two prominent political prisoners, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, leader of the Indonesian Labour Welfare Union, and Muchtar Pakpahan, a member of the United Development Party, an opposition group with strong Muslim support.

The Justice Minister has gone as far as to consider for release all political prisoners, other than those connected to the communist party, and to re-evaluate the Situation of East Timorese jailed for their political dissent.

Although it is not the time for the Indonesian people to take once more to the streets, they must remain vigilant and apply pressure on the government to make good on its promise for reforms. If they do not, the government might advantage of the people to buy time to cool down present tensions and leave the nation's hierarchical power structures largely intact.

The Habibie government must draft a new constitution that would bring about a working democracy and cut off the military from influencing the nation's political affairs. Wiranto has the chance to show his devotion to his country's best interests by creating a role for the army as the defender of the nation, apart from the realm of politics.

The Burmese regime has always looked to Indonesia for a model of economic prosperity coupled with political authoritarianism. The military government recognised that economic prosperity was the key to their holding power, just as Suharto and his circle did. But now, in Indonesia, Habibie has acknowledged the importance of a stable domestic political life in securing the foreign loans necessary to revive his country's shattered economy.

Indeed, Indonesia can continue to receive funds from the International Monetary Fund only after a reassessment by that organisation of the political and economic situation there. It seems that the technocrat Habibie has realised that the best economic interests of his nation lie with a stable and open political system. The regime in Burma, unfortunately, seems to be taking the opposite course. The military government has forced the closure of most non-military affiliated colleges and universities, effectively eliminating the chance for a strong middle class to emerge in Burma. Prospects for political stability have likewise been undercut by the continued policy of outlawing opposition parties and arresting their leaders.

Help from the IMP is not an option due to the Burmese government's flagrant human rights violations, so Burma's economy will continue its downward slide for the foreseeable future.

However, the recent events in Indonesia suggest a pattern of positive political developments in Southeast Asia. Just as Burma has followed a parallel course with Indonesia over the past three decades, Suharto's resignation was prompted by the will of the people, much like the "people power" movement that swept Ferdinand Marcos from office in the Philippines.